La Resa Degli U-boot

[Saiph]

Comandanti,

questo fu il testo trasmesso a tutti gli U-boot per la resa (tradotto in inglese :s34: )

 

To all \"U\" Boats at sea:

 

Carry out the following instuctions forthwith which have been given by the Allied Representatives:

(A) Surface immediately and remain surfaced.

( Report immediately in P/L your position in latitude and longitude and number of your \"U\" Boat to nearest British, US, Canadian or Soviet coast W/T station on 500 kc/s (600 metres) and to call sign GZZ 10 on one of the following high frequencies: 16845 - 12685 or 5970 kc/s.

© Fly a large black or blue flag by day.

(D) Burn navigation lights by night.

(E) Jettison all ammunition, remove breachblocks from guns and render torpedos safe by removing pistols. All mines are to be rendered safe.

(F) Make all signals in P/L.

(G) Follow strictly the instructions for proceeding to Allied ports from your present area given in immediately following message.

(H) Observe strictly the orders of Allied Representatives to refrain from scuttling or in any way damaging your \"U\" Boat.

2. These instructions will be repeated at two-hour intervals until further notice.

ANNEXURE \'B\'

To all \"U\" Boats at sea:

Observe strictly the instructions already given to remain fully surfaced. Report your position course and speed every 8 hours. Obey any instructions that may be given to you by any Allied authority.

The following are the areas and routes for \"U\" Boats surrendering-

(1) Area \'A\'.

a. Bound on West by meridian 026 degs West and South by parallel 043 degs North in Barents Sea by meridian 020 degs East in Baltic Approaches by line joining the Naze and Hantsholm but excludes Irish Sea between 051 degs thirty mins and 055 degs 00 mins North and English Channel between line of Lands End Scilly Islands Ushant and line of Dover-Calais.

b. Join one of following routes at nearest point and procceed along it to Loch Eriboll (058 degs 33 minutes North 004 degs 37 mins West)

 

 

Blue route: All positions North and West unless otherwise indicated:

049 degs 00 mins 009 degs 00 mins 053 degs 00 mins

012 degs 00 mins 058 degs 00 mins 011 degs 00 mins

059 degs 00 mins 005 degs 30 mins thence to Loch Eriboll

 

Red route:

053 degs 45 mins North 003 degs 00 mins East

059 degs 45 mins 001 degs 00 mins 059 degs 45 mins

003 degs 00 mins thence to Loch Eriboll.

c. Arrive at Loch Eriboll between sunrise and 3 hours before sunset.

(2) Area \'B\'

a. The Irish Sea between parallel of 051 degs 30 mins and 055 degs 00 mins North.

b. Proceed Beaumaris Bay (053 degs 19 mins North 003 degs 58 mins West) to arrive between sunrise and 3 hours before sunset.

(3) Area \'C\'

a. The English Channel between line of Lands End - Scilly Isles - Ushant and line of Dover - Calais.

b. \'U\' Boats in area \'C\' are to join one of following routes at nearest point: Green route: position \'A\' 049 degs 10 mins North 005 degs 40 mins West position \'B\' 050 degs 00 mins North 003 degs 00 mins West thence escorted to Weymouth. Orange route: position \'X\' 050 degs 30 mins North 000 degs 50 mins East position \'Y\' 050 degs 10 mins North 001 degs 50 mins West thence escorted to Weymouth.

c. Arrive at either \'B\' or \'Y\' between sunrise and 3 hours before sunset.

(4) Area \'D\'

a. Bound on West by lines joining The Naze and Hantsholm and on East by lines joining Lübeck and Trelleborg.

b. Proceed to Kiel.

(5) Area \'E\'

a. Mediterranean Approaches bound on North by 043 degs North on South by 026 degs North and on West by 026 degs West.

b. Proceed to a rendezvous in position \'A\' 036 degs 00 mins North 011 degs 00 mins West and await escort reporting expected time of arrival in plain language to Admiral Gibraltar on 500 kc/s.

c. Arrive in position \'A\' between sunrise and noon G.M.T.

(6) Area \'F\'

a. The North and South Atlantic West of 026 degs West.

b. Proceed to nearest of one of following points arriving between sunrise and 3 hours before sunset: W 043 degs 30 mins North 070 degs 00 mins West approach from a point 15 miles due East X 038 degs 20 mins North 074 degs 25 mins West approach from a point 047 degs 18 mins North 051 30 mins West on a course 270 degs Z 043 31 mins North 065 degs 05 mins West approach from point 042 degs 59 mins North 054 degs 28 mins West on a course 320 degs.

 

Ma foste stati voi al comando di uno di questi mezzi non avreste cercato di raggiungere il paese neutrale più vicino????

[de domenico]

A parte il ben noto battello classe IX C (mi pare) che approdò in Argentina addirittura nel giugno 1945 (e la cui vicenda più volte raccontata è alla base di tutte le più o meno mirabolanti fantasticherie sulla fuga di Hitler, di Bormann e quant'altro) nessun U-Boot ha neppure provato in quella circostanza a raggiungere il Giappone, che pure continuava la guerra. Come mai? Primo perché in realtà i rapporti tra i due alleati non erano affatto buoni (ho letto un libro, mi pare fosse "The Uncertain Allies" o qualcosa di simile, sull'argomento), e secondo perché forse anche gli Uebermensch dell'arma sottomarina germanica ne avevano avuto abbastanza.

[Saiph]

Già!

in realtà i casi di resa agli argentini sono 2:

- U-530 type IXC/40 arresosi il 10 Luglio 1945 nella baia Mar della Plata, comandante Otto Wermuth

- U-977 type VIIC arresosi il 17 Agosto 1945 nella baia mar della Plata, comandante Heinz Schaffaer (questo è quello famoso delle leggende!)

 

a tal proposito porto alla vostra attenzione stralci dell'interrogatorio fatto a Schaffaer da parte dei servizi segreti argentini:

 

S T A T E M E N T O F S C H A E F F E R

 

C. O. O F U – 9 7 7

 

“I left Kristiansand S. on 2 May 1945, normally equipped, and under orders to proceed to the Channel, (i.e. English Channel).

 

A few days later I picked up fragments of signals, which I suspected of being the work of enemy deception. When, however, these signals were not cancelled, I had to assume that the radio stations had fallen into enemy hands and that we had lost the war. The fact that the uncoded signals signed “Allied Committee” were coming through, convinced me that the orders contained in these signals were illegitimate and not in agreement with the German High Command. When we began our patrol, an official slogan had been posted on all Naval establishments and ships which said: The enemy shall find in Germany nothing but rats and mice. We will never capitulate. Better death than slavery.

 

It must be remembered that radio reception on board the U-977 was only sporadic since, for tactical reasons, we only occasionally came to Schnorchel depth. However, enough signals had been received so that I no longer had any superiors, and that I was relieved of my oath. In any case, I did not feel obligated without direct orders from my government to accept enemy orders.

 

I no longer considered my ship as a man-of-war, but as a means of escape, and I tried to act for the best interests of all aboard. I respected the wishes of members of my crew insofar as they did not imperil the ship or cause damage to it.

 

One of my main reasons in deciding to proceed to the Argentine was based on German propaganda, which claimed that the American and British newspapers advocated that at the end of the war, all German men be enslaved and sterilized. Another consideration was the bad treatment and long delay in return home suffered by German prisoners-of-war held in France at the end of World War I. Then again, of course, the hope of better living conditions in the Argentine.

 

It was absolutely my intention to deliver the boat undamaged into Allied hands, while doing the best I could for my crew. I felt that the ship’s engines might be a valuable adjunct to the reconstruction of Europe. I carried out these intentions and delivered the boat in perfect condition.”

 

Alla faccia del comandante stanco e piegato da anni di guerra! :s31:

[de domenico]

Vorrei solo ricordare che l'Argentina aveva dichiarato guerra a Germania e Giappone solo il 27 marzo 1945, ultimo dei paesi latino-americani a farlo. Altri, come Cile, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay lo avevano fatto solo a gennaio-febbraio 1945, sopratutto per poter essere ammessi tra le potenze vincitrici nella nuova United Nations Organisation appena creata, e nonostante la resistenza delle numerose e influenti comunità tedesche locali (Cile, Argentina).

Ma forse questo il nostro comandante di U 977 non lo sapeva nemmeno, e pensava di trovare ancora un'Argentina filo-tedesca.

[de domenico]

Ho trovato il libro di cui parlavo, "Reluctant Allies: German-Japanese Naval Relations in World War II", volume collettaneo di H.J. Krug, Y. Hirama, B.J. Sander-Nagashima e Axel Niestlé, Naval Institute Press, 2001. E' interessante perché descrive l'incompatibilità di fondo tra il pregiudizio razziale antiasiatico dei nazisti e l'incrollabile fiducia giapponese nella propria superiorità: gli Uebermensch contro i kamikaze e i reparti isolati nipponici che continuavano imperterriti la guerra venti o trent'anni dopo nelle isole del Pacifico ... A chi dare la Ritterkreuz?

[walter leotta]

@saiph

a proposito dell'interrogatorio, hai qualcosa sull'accusa rivolta al comandante dell'U977 in merito allo "strano" affondamento dell'incrociatore brasiliano BAHIA?

grazie

[Saiph]

Negli atti ufficiali che ho trovato (e sono solo stralci!!!) non e` neppure menzionato il Bahia....

Del resto Schaeffer era stato categorico, U977 non era piú un mezzo da combattimento ma solo un mezzo di trasporto\fuga... e considerato che quando si é arreso il mezzo era integro e i siluri tutti al loro posto, resi inoffesnsivi, credo che il bahia sia parte della mistificazione creata attorno a U977.

cmq ho scoperto che il comandante Schaeffer é ancora in vita....! chissá quanti gli avranno rotto le scatole per chiedergli tutti i particolari.... :s41:

confesso che ho cercato in internet se trovavo un suo indirizzo email per lo stesso motivo!!!!!

[Saiph]

Leggendo Wikipedia, però vedo che il Bahia ufficialmente affondò per un incidente (un colpo della 20 mm sulle bombe di profondità durante un'esercitazione).

 

Di seguito ho recuperato parte del diario di bordo dell'U-977:

 

After loading provisions, celebrating May Day, and holding a flag ceremony for Hitler’s reported death, U-977 left Kristiansand on her first and last war patrol 2 May 1945 at 2200. Using her Schnorchel 3 to 4 hours each night she proceeded submerged along the Norwegian coast. On 7 May the observation periscope was damaged due to its being left up while diving.

 

When the German surrender became official 8 May, there were long discussions on board U-977, then in the vicinity of Bergen. Those of the married crew members who so desired were given the choice of leaving the boat or continuing to Argentina. On 10 May between 0230 and 0330 three enlisted men and 13 petty officers accordingly took 3 of the large rubber boats, one of which was damaged and abandoned, and 16 of the one-man rubber boats and put ashore at the island of Holsenöy near Bergen. (O.N.I. Note: These men were subsequently taken into custody by the British and described themselves as “survivors” of the U-977.)

 

In the subsequent voyage the remaining 32 officers and men stood only their usual respective watches, 4 hours on and 8 off, however with less men on each watch. It was stated that the only one remaining man regretted giving up was the pharmacist’s mate.

 

U-977 made for the Iceland Passage on course 3000, diving once on sighting a plane and once on sighting a ship; she was also DF’d many times late in May. She passed Madeira about 100 miles to the west and made for the Cape Verde Islands on course 1970.

 

On 14 July 1945 the U-boat anchored for 4 hours, 1630 to 2030 on the SW side of Branco, in the Cape Verdes. The crew went swimming and also sang for a while on deck. The next day at 2030 a ship was sighted and avoided by changing course, and at 0303 on 21 July a plane was sighted. On 22 July St. Paul Rocks was passed 25 miles off the starboard beam.

 

At 0600 on 23 July they crossed the equator at approximately 300 W., and 28 of the 32 officers and men were given the customary Neptune Ceremony. The next day at 0130, 0230, and 0300 a plane was sighted three times (or possibly 3 different planes). Another plane was sighted at 1125 on 26 July and a further one the next day.

 

It was on 30 July 1945 that SCHAEFFER learned that the U-boat preceding him in Argentina, the U-530, with her crew would be sent to North America, but this information caused no change in his plans. A test dive to 40 meters was made 1 August. A large ship was sighted the next day and another 13 August.