Spark

Grazie, una segnalazione utilissima.

Ho visto questa carta su twitter e l'ho trovata affascinante, così ho pensato di postarla qua. https://tile.loc.gov/image-services/iiif/service:gmd:gmd7:g7421:g7421p:ct003756/full/pct:25/0/default.jpg Da quel che ho appreso cercando online, Marittima Italiana era parte integrante della Lloyd Triestino e ha gestito le tratte per l'Oriente dall'Italia a partire dal 1936. Questa data mi lascia perplesso: qualcuno può confermarla? La carta sembrerebbe anteriore.

Intanto grazie ad entrambi! Questo è il genere di biblioteche in cui ci si perderebbe volentieri, c'è una bella varietà di temi, pubblicazioni straniere e soprattutto di edizioni - alcune delle quali piuttosto rare. E poi è annessa al museo! L'idea di catalogare i testi presenti mi pare, adesso, ancora più rilevante. Ho letto che ospita circa 5.000 volumi, non sarebbe un lavoro semplice ma neppure eccessivo. Comunque, vale la pena passare da Francavilla al mare. Confermato. (E alla prossima tornata devo necessariamente diventare socio di Betasom, ché organizzate degli eventi davvero magnifici, lasciatemelo dire)

Una "scoperta" veramente interessante: non sapevo nulla a riguardo e non ho trovato nessun cenno di questo cannone. Speriamo che qualcuno riesca ad aggiungere altre informazioni! Grazie intanto della segnalazione

Si direbbe uno splendido incontro! Il museo mi è parso incantevole, specie la piccola ma fornita biblioteca. Qualcuno ha delle fotografie in alta risoluzione di quest'ultima? Curioserei volentieri fra i titoli dei libri là conservati!

Benvenuto, Stefano!

Caspita, sono stupendi!

Senza entrare nel merito della complessa "questione dei migranti", quello da te riportato è un fatto vergognoso che un'organizzazione migliore e più previdente avrebbe potuto e dovuto sicuramente evitare. Spero solo che l'accaduto non venga politicamente strumentalizzato, perché personalmente ritengo che il problema in questo caso non risieda di certo nei "migranti"-

Un errore di progettazione non da poco! Si ha qualche stima su quanto ammonterebbe l'onere delle modifiche per nave?

Benvenuto su Betasom!

Benvenuto!

"The Daily Mirror reports on the heavy losses the Royal Navy suffered when it engaged the German Fleet at the Battle of Jutland." http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/mirror03_01.shtml

Un articolo interessante - ma da prendere con le pinze - sul Telegraph, scritto da Nicholas Jellicoe, nipote dell'ammiraglio Jellicoe, già nominato poco sopra. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/men/thinking-man/even-nelson-could-not-have-done-better-at-jutland-than-my-grandf/ Nel link c'è l'articolo per intero, qua riporto un breve estratto: I seriously doubt that, under the conditions that day, a Nelson would have done any better. He knew that a failure at Trafalgar only risked a third of British naval assets, whereas Jellicoe was, in Churchill’s famous words, “the only man on either side who could have lost the war in an afternoon”. The entire complement of British first-line ships was deployed at Jutland, and both sides were fighting with new and mainly untried technologies – long-range gunnery, fire control systems, torpedoes, mines, new ship designs. The stalemate at Jutland convinced the German high command that they could never win a fleet-to-fleet action. Instead, they aggressively resumed unrestricted submarine activity as the only chance of winning a war bogged down on the western front. ---- Avrei voluto riportare anche alcune immagini ma non ci sono riuscito, sono consultabili comunque all'indirizzo originale.

Aggiungo anche un celebre articolo del 1996, adesso in open access: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00253359.1996.10656595

https://medium.com/@DrSamWillis/jutland-naval-battles-and-the-ghost-of-seapower-d4aa174f11f2#.5wbdjuxby The British obsess about naval battles and always have done. Yes, we are an island nation; yes the sea matters; but that does not necessarily mean that it matters MORE than it does — or it did — to France or Germany: The French coastline is longer than ours; Germany was as dependent on maritime imports in WW1 as we were, hence the key position of maritime blockade of Germany in British strategy during the war. And what of the battle of Jutland itself? Yes it was ‘indecisive’ but what were people expecting then? And what do people consider now to be ‘decisive?’. ‘They wanted a new Trafalgar’ they cried then, and everyone cries now, but here’s the key thing about Trafalgar that everyone tends to overlook: Trafalgar was fought in 1805 but we didn’t defeat Napoleon until 1815. That’s a DECADE later. So the really interesting question has two sides to it: one is the actual impact of seapower upon history and the other is the public perception of the impact of seapower upon history. The role of the historian, of course, is to bring the two together as closely as possible. Far more, indeed, needs to be written about the impact of seapower upon history but we do at least know that seapower affects economics, politic, culture, society and so on in an enormous variety of ways. In fact, fleets of naval ships don’t even have to do anything to affect history. They can simply exist and exude a threat thereby influencing history. So often the impact of seapower needs to be measured in its promise rather than its actual effect, and so too must its ghost be considered — fleets influenced wars long after their presence left a theatre of operations. Jutland, then, must be weighed and measured in numerous ways. Ok the British expected a victory and they expected that victory to rapidly and directly affect the war, and for me that is the interesting point — for it reveals an ignorance of naval history that has influenced British politics and cultural thought for a century. Naval battles simply do NOT affect wars that quickly and never have done, which means that in this obsession with naval battles we find a fascinating flaw in the British psyche — a love for seapower allied with a curious misunderstanding of how it works. (Sam Willis)

Titolo: The Battle of Jutland Autore: John Brooks Casa editrice: Cambridge University Press Serie: Cambridge Military Histories Anno di edizione: 2016 Pagine: 584 Prezzo: €48,00 su Amazon con copertina rigida, €28 in versione Kindle. Reperibilità: facile John Brooks non è un nome che suona nuovo per chi ha familiarità con la Battaglia dello Jutland. Oltre ad un vasto numero di articoli sul tema, J. Brooks nel 2005 ha infatti pubblicato per la Routledge un'opera fondamentale, dal titolo "Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland: The Question of Fire Control", che ha modificato sensibilmente l'interpretazione storiografica di quegli avvenimenti. Con il libro pubblicato dalla CUP, Brooks si propone adesso di ricostruire con quanta più precisione possibile le premesse, le azioni e le relative conseguenze inerenti a tale battaglia, fornendo un quadro dettagliato e aggiornato che possa fare chiarezza sulle azioni navali avvenute tra il 31 maggio e l'1 giugno del 1916. Non mancano analisi e considerazioni prettamente tecniche sulle due flotte, così come sezioni dedicate agli ordini di battaglia, corredate da mappe e da tavole a cui attingere per estrapolare un gran numero di dati relativi alle navi che presero parte alla Battaglia dello Jutland. L'obiettivo di Brooks è molto chiaro: come per gli altri volumi della serie "Cambridge Military Histories", l'autore non propone tesi innovative, utilizza invece le fonti più certe ed affidabili per descrivere l'oggetto del suo lavoro, con il proposito di farsi "reference" per ogni futuro studio. Un proposito che, dal punto di vista meramente descrittivo, può dirsi riuscito: la Battaglia dello Jutland è brillantemente racchiusa nelle 600 pagine di questo volume in ogni sua sfumatura. Semmai, lascia perplessi la decisione, spiegata dallo stesso Brooks nell'introduzione, di non entrare nel merito delle discussioni storiografiche che da sempre costituiscono un elemento cruciale per la corretta comprensione della Battaglia. In questo senso, l'opera di Brooks non può essere considerata come un "definitive work" sull'argomento, e se sicuramente sarà un punto di riferimento per gli anni avvenire nella ricostruzione della battaglia, non lo sarà tuttavia nella ricomposizione delle vicende storiografiche che l'hanno accompagnata.

Molto belle e fruibili! Grazie per aver tempestivamente provveduto a darci un'idea delle cartine, gentilissimo (segnalo intanto, per chi fosse interessato, che su Amazon.it si trova a €13,60)

Una data certamente suggestiva: il centesimo anniversario di quella che è, probabilmente, la più discussa battaglia navale della storia contemporanea. Mi permetto di aggiungere qualche fonte internazionale. https://defenceindepth.co/2016/05/31/the-battle-of-jutland-an-unpalatable-result/ Questa è una breve, ma pur sempre interessante, analisi di John Brooks: The Battle of Jutland (in Germany of the Skagerrak) took place on 31 May and 1 June 1916. It was the only fleet encounter of World War I with 151 British and 99 German warships present: battleships, battlecruisers, armoured cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers. The battle ended with the British Grand Fleet still dominant in the North Sea and with the German High Seas Fleet retreating to its bases. But the price of this strategic victory had been no less than a tactical defeat. British casualties were 6,768 killed and wounded, while the German total was 3,058. The Royal Navy lost three battlecruisers, three armoured cruisers and eight destroyers: Germany, one battlecruiser, one predreadnought battleship, five destroyers and also four light cruisers. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, the British Commander-in-Chief, wrote of the battlecruiser actions that ‘the result cannot be other than unpalatable’ but this verdict can apply equally to the whole battle. Part of the explanation lies in the greater tendency for fires in British gun propellant to develop into catastrophic magazine explosions. But why was the British fleet unable to inflict greater losses on its weaker opponent? Just before 3.30pm on 31 May, the opposing scouting forces sighted each other – they were the British Battle Cruiser Fleet (the BCF) led by Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty and the German Ist Scouting Group (the ISG) commanded by Vice-Admiral Franz Hipper. Of the BCF’s three squadrons, that commanded by Rear-Admiral Horace Hood was with the battlefleet but temporarily Beatty had been given four fast battleships from the 5th Battle Squadron (the 5BS). Hipper reversed course, enticing Beatty in ‘the Run to the South’ towards the advancing German battlefleet led by Vice-Admiral Reinhard Scheer. Yet, despite a report of nearby heavy enemy ships, Beatty had done nothing to concentrate his forces; the 5BS would take no part in the first phase of the coming action. Beatty still had six battlecruisers to the German five. But his approach was too steep; when Hipper opened fire, the British battlecruisers were still manoeuvring to free themselves from smoke interference; in the main, their ranges were inaccurate; the two rear battlecruisers were still struggling to get into line; not all the British turrets were bearing; and one German ship had not been selected as a target. In this first phase, the British ships made only 6 hits to at least 22 German, including those that caused the cordite explosions that sank Indefatigable. In the second phase, the British battlecruisers probably scored only three hits whereas the 5BS made as many as seven at long range. The ISG obtained at least thirteen more hits and Queen Mary also blew up but, just afterwards, Hipper was forced to turn away by the fire from the 5BS and by a timely attack by Beatty’s destroyers. As soon as Beatty sighted the High Seas Fleet, he turned about, with the 5BS trailing some three miles astern, to lead Scheer in the ‘Run to the North’ towards Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet. But the battlecruisers went out of action for almost 25 minutes, leaving the battleships to engage all the German forces. Also, Beatty allowed his destroyer flotillas to remain on his disengaged flank, where they were no threat to the pursuing enemy. As soon as Jellicoe learned that Beatty was in action, the C-in-C sent Hood’s three battlecruisers ahead to rejoin the BCF, leaving the armoured cruisers as the battlefleet’s only advanced force. Just as the two battlefleets made contact, at 6.15pm Jellicoe deployed his battleships from columns into single line and ‘crossed the T’ of Scheer’s line. But the armoured cruisers led by Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot were caught between the lines, his flagship Defence blowing up and Warrior being fatally damaged. Shortly afterwards, at the end of a brief action with the ISG, Hood’s flagship Invincible also exploded, though not before crippling Hipper’s flagship Lützow. Visibility was now bad, especially for the Germans, and Scheer had to disengage by an action-turn-about, that is, a near-simultaneous course reversal by his whole line. To the British, the enemy disappeared into the mist but Jellicoe delayed turning in pursuit. Nevertheless, by making a second action-turn-about prematurely, Scheer found Jellicoe once again crossing his T. Meanwhile, Beatty had refused to pursue the ISG; instead, at about seven o’clock, he led his reunited battlecruisers through a complete circle, after which they were in a position to fire only a few ineffective salvos at long ranges as the battle reached its climax. Scheer again vanished when, to get out of trouble, he ordered a third action-turn-about under cover of attacks by his battlecruisers and some destroyer flotillas. Partly due to Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram’s hesitant leadership of the British van, Jellicoe had not yet reformed his battleships into single line. With the attacking German flotillas posing a clear threat, at least to the rear British divisions, Jellicoe elected to turn all his battle squadrons away, losing contact for good with the enemy battlefleet. Then Commodore (Flotillas) James Hawksley led an attack, though by only a half-flotilla, but he was peremptorily recalled by Jellicoe before he could find the disorganised enemy. About an hour later, with dusk approaching, Beatty briefly encountered the ISG and the German predreadnoughts but he did not follow them when they turned away. As night fell, Jellicoe turned South for the night, with his flotillas and a light cruiser squadron five miles astern of his battleship columns: but Scheer decided that he must return SSE’wards past Horns Reef off the Jutland coast. As he crossed astern of the British battlefleet, costly attacks by British light forces led to the loss of three German light cruisers. Three more flotillas were still well-placed for a massed attack from ahead on the advancing German line but this opportunity was lost when Captain James Farie suddenly turned his 13th Flotilla sharply away from the enemy. Some destroyers still crossed ahead of the German van but they neither attacked nor reported the enemy. Later, at daybreak, one division of the 12th Flotilla, led by Commander Anselan Stirling, sank the predreadnought Pommern but Maenad (Commander John Champion), by turning about, obstructed the attacks of those boats that had been following her. After dark, Jellicoe received one Admiralty signal stating clearly that Scheer had ordered his forces to return past Horns Reef, a course that was consistent with the firing that could be seen from the British flagship. But the only clear report from Jellicoe’s own ships gave the German course as South and he chose to believe that the enemy fleet was still following him. At 2.30am, Jellicoe turned North but his hopes of quickly picking up his destroyers and encountering the High Seas Fleet were both disappointed – the enemy forces were already out of reach. Throughout the battle British commanders (knowingly or not) missed opportunities to inflict more damage on enemy ships, to limit losses to their own ship, or even both at once. The battle began badly when Beatty made the elementary tactical blunder of not engaging with his whole force. If his ten ships had concentrated on Hipper’s five, most probably Indefatigable and Queen Mary would have survived and the ISG would have been finished as a fighting force. If Beatty had supported the 5BS throughout the Run to the North, they would have received less damage and inflicted more on the German battleships; also his destroyers were not in a position to intervene at the critical moment of deployment. He would not pursue the enemy battlecruisers either after the sinking of Invincible or when he encountered them again at the end of the day; at either time, even a few more hits on Seydlitz would have ensured her loss. Despite minimal information about the enemy, Jellicoe made the best possible deployment but it was marred by the destruction of Arbuthnot’s armoured cruisers and Invincible, the unforeseen consequence of sending Hood ahead. Since the outbreak of the War, Jellicoe had been apprehensive of attacks with torpedoes and mines and of his ships’ ability to withstand underwater hits; these concerns discouraged him from pressing home his advantages, while Jerram’s hesitant leadership of the van added to his problems; eventually Jellicoe turned away from the enemy and lost contact. He undoubtedly misjudged Scheer’s movements during the night but, if they had met near Horns Reef at dawn, it is far from certain who would have inflicted the greater damage. Of the destroyer leaders, after Jellicoe’s rebuke Hawksley missed two opportunities to attack during the day. But Pommern’s sinking by Stirling’s flotilla showed what might have been accomplished during the night if Farie had not broken up the destroyer concentration that stood in the way of the retiring High Seas Fleet. The strategic outcome of the Battle of Jutland would probably not have been much different anyway. But if British commanders had seized their tactical opportunities, the losses in ships and men would have been more evenly balanced and the tactical result would have been much more palatable. ----- Inoltre, ecco un video molto ben realizzato (voluto da N. Jellicoe, autore di una buona storia sullo Jutland recentemente pubblicata dalla Seaforth):

Non sapevo di questo volume. Leggere di un Cernuschi accostato a questo periodo storico mi ha sorpreso, almeno inizialmente: sarà l'abitudine di saperlo immerso nella storia navale del ventesimo secolo. Comunque, sinora Cernuschi è sempre stato (nella mia esperienza) garanzia di qualità, spero quindi che anche questo volume, nonostante le relativamente poche pagine, mantenga le promesse (e sono curioso di osservare le cartine preparate da V. O'Hara). Grazie per aver aperto la discussione, penso sia sicuramente un libro da leggere.

Sei stato sintetico ma veramente esaustivo, grazie per l'interessante update sulla situazione.

Ohh, interessante! Ho appuntato un paio di film che non conosco e, fra questi, in particolare "Battleship". A suo tempo non l'ho visto, pensavo fosse solo un esagerato film americano con una nave di mezzo e that's all, ma le tue quattro stelle mi hanno convinto a dargli una chance.

Considerando che la Russia ha ritirato parte delle forze dislocate in Siria, possiamo presumere che il pattugliamento della Kuznetsov sia rivolto anche a mantenere sotto controllo la situazione nel Levante, tenendo pronta una task force, quantomeno aerea, capace di intervenire tempestivamente a sostegno di Assad (ammesso che a settembre Assad sia ancora al potere, ma suppongo di sì).

Se possibile, poterlo leggere farebbe piacere anche a me, mi sono incuriosito non poco dopo aver seguito questa discussione (anche se "silenziosamente", perché sull'argomento non mi sento abbastanza competente).

In questo campo sono molto, molto ignorante quindi perdonate le domande, forse stupide, che sto per porre. Tuttavia, vedendo la foto, mi sono subito chiesto: non ci sono troppi uomini per una postazione di questo tipo? Capisco le difficoltà del colpire un bersaglio aereo in movimento con armi del genere, tuttavia rimango comunque perplesso. Quante postazioni del genere erano state attrezzate in una città come Venezia? E come erano distribuite in città (in maniera omogenea o solo ai margini delle zone strategicamente più importanti? Tutte le postazioni contavano così tanti uomini o ve ne erano di più "piccole"? O forse quella in foto costituisce un'eccezione e la foto è più che altro propagandistica?)? Capisco anche che il concetto di difesa AA non fosse neppure lontanamente paragonabile a quello della 2WW, le necessità erano di gran lunga inferiori e interessavano un'area limitata visto il modesto raggio d'azione dei velivoli, comunque mi pare che approntare difese AA del tipo della foto (seppure in un'area ristretta) avrebbe comportato un non indifferente dispendio in termini di manpower, sbaglio?

Che articolo interessante! Grazie per averlo postato! (un minuscolo appunto: c'è qualche errorino di formattazione qua e là. Niente di grave comunque)